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Toward a Critique of
Girard's Model of Reading
Francesco Garritano

1. INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary debate on hermeneutics, one of the
liveliest arguments regards the will to understand, the interpreter's sensitivity to come to the text intending to listen to what
it says. "Willingness to understand" not only is an assumption of
hermeneutics as a technical discipline, but also, according to
Gadamer, 1 regulates all of social life, so that understanding is the
initial moment of any collective practice.
In this willingness-which entails laying aside assumptions and their verification-are
found the beginnings of common sense, of history .
Contact between the present and the past, the reception and
enrichment of tradition, occurs with the acceptance of and opening up toward the other, all of which takes the form of a prolongation and propagation of the diastasis. Gadamer has always held
fast to these ideas and defended them forcefully whenever questioned, as in his encounter with Derrida in Paris in April 1981.
[Translatedfrom the Italian by MichaelRocke]
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Derrida hypothesized that the Gadamerian "willingness to
understand" as the preliminary moment of interpretation and of
the relationship with truth, corresponds to the will to consensus,
and therefore to a dialectic and metaphysical will. 2 In short,
Derrida maintains that willingness coincides with intentionality,
with the result that the other is absorbed by the conscience, in
accordance with the typical procedures of dialectics. The third is
thus reduced to the duality on which metaphysics is constructed,
so that the other is the other of oneself. This is where Derrida
places understanding, whose decisive moment in his opinion is
not contact but interruption. This phenomenon is easily seen in
psychoanalytic hermeneutics, where understanding presupposes
a change of code, or rather, the translation of the text and its insertion into a different contextual scene. 3 The doubts Derrida raises
about the hermeneutic tradition from Heidegger to Gadamer are
serious, and culminate in this question:
Whether one speaks of consensus or of misunderstanding
(Schleiermacher), we wonder if the condition of Verstehen,rather
than a continuum of the relationship, as was said last evening, may
not in fact be the interruption of the relationship, a certain relationship of interruption, the suspension of any mediation whatsoever? 4

With these words Derrida formulated a solid attack on hermeneutics as an attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, to think about the
essence of being, an attack to which Gadamer later responded. 5
While it is true that in arguing that the will to understand is intentionality, Derrida reiterates his belief that hermeneutics, both
Heideggerian and Gadamerian, follows the metaphysical tradition, it is also true that, in the end, what he claims-that understanding is understanding of the self and not of the other-is
confirmed in reality. Here we would like to dwell precisely on a
case of the suspension of understanding.
2. HISTORY AND TRUTH

In 1964 Rene Girard published an essay on Camus, "Pour un
nouveau proces de L'Etranger,"6 in which he exemplarily commits
the gesture of interrupting the mediation which Derrida highlighted. What happens in this essay? Girard performs a reading
of Camus's text in which he places the idea of the absurd within
the framework of underground logic, of the triangular desire he
speaks about in Mensonge romantique et desir romanesque and in
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Dostoevski du double a I' unite.7 According to Girard, Camus used
The Stranger to mask his desire for success, for approval from the
public opinion he condemned as incapable of being just. 8 As is
well known, Girard regards triangular desire as a consequence of
nihilism, of the death of God, in the sense that the loss of unity
unleashes a struggle to occupy the empty place, a contest that
grows among men and leads to idolatry . This is explicit in the
two texts mentioned above, works in which Girard emphasizes
the need to overcome metaphysical desire (that which tries to substitute for God), something which occurs in the novel, a place of
reconciliation. 9 Girard's discourse highlights the loss of values
(what he designates as nihilism) and the need to put this event
behind us, that is, the urgency of rebuilding harmony to put an
end to underground logic .
Girard applies this model to Camus without too much concern since he clearly sees the connection between the death of
God and metaphysical desire, and therefore believes he can speak
of "nihilist individualism." 10 In reality, however, the con-sequentialness between the eclipse of the center and desire is not, as
Girard would like, marked by God's death but by his presence: to
deny God means in any case to acknowledge him, so to assert his
presence does not correspond to the gesture of rejecting nihilism.
In short, Girard does not thoroughly explore the problem of
nihilism, but merely accepts the perspective handed down from
metaphysics-that
is, the opposition being-nothingness-without
dwelling on the possibility of their connection.
With these
assumptions Girard fails to grasp the two central themes of
Camus's query (responsibility and justice), and instead simply
finds a replacement for them: the death of the divinity implies the
triumph of the human, with the result that grace (Girard's harmonizing element) yields to the will to dominate, to man's pretext of
being just. In other words the absurd-as separation, liberty, and
responsibility-is
grace. Girard forgets what, according to Sartre,
is Camus's problem par excellence:ethics. 11
All this finds its justification in that Girard does not contemplate entity in proximity to being-in other words, he does not
evaluate the truth of the latter: oblivion. While Camus proceeds
from the eternal's decreasing luminosity, from the disappearance
of harmonizing unity, and confronts the question of man's responsibility, of destiny as depresentation of the quotidian, Girard
remains with the idea that being is entity. This perspective cannot
but lead him to consider the Camusian revolt and the query about
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ethics as a false problem: justice is the human pretext of substituting man for God as the origin of grace, and justice returns to grace
after having passed through the state of underground logic . This
point of view guides his interpretation of Camus, so that one
arrives at understanding not in the mediation between text and
reader, but in the affirmation of the present. Thus the exasperation of Girard's vision is verified by virtue of the fact that his
action is accompanied by presence, by a being that surrenders
itself completel y and consequently has no need to re-present itself
in order to be affirmed. Girard refuses to verify his preconceived
idea, with the inevitable consequence that his interpretation of
The Stranger acquires everything specific to ideological discourse.
In short, Girard regards the truth as already given, an emanation
of the divinity present even when underground logic prevails.
The effect of this concept is the end of history, the occurrence
of truth in every human action . It appears that Girard actually
declares the separation of truth and history: to ensure that its historical manifestations do not constitute revelatory moments, truth
is taken to be (to use Pareyson's expression) but the repetition of
the identical truth, that is, the repetition of the same. Girard disregards the multiple character of truth, the oblivion from which it
is led onto the historical scene . In this way, history loses its character as "access-way to truth," 12 as a dialogue between past and
present and the revisitation of both, while events in their diversity
are illuminated by a fullness, by an unalterable truth . The arbitrariness of Girard' s interpretation is thus justified and justifiable
according to the perspective of classical metaphysics: being is,
and the bias that the interpreter rigorously defends is the primacy
of this truth. It is opportune to dwell on this disregard for the historical character of truth . Truth cannot be an object that grows or
diminishes but, on the contrary, remains immobile even when, on
the level of events, there seem to be variations.
To return to Camus and Girard, the former regards truth as
the depresentat ion of the present, while the latter rejects this point
of view. The interpreter (Girard) resolves the tension according to
the dynamics of triangular desire, a nihilism that keeps the truth
very much alive. We are thus in the realm of the dialectical tradition, of pre-fi xed synthesis, and so no ontic contradiction
impugns being as presence. Continuing on the level of consequentiality, Girard' s lack of understanding arises with regard to
the ethical problem in Camus. If truth is fulfilled and puts an end
to becoming, morality cannot change, in the sense that it is not
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subject to reformulation.
To accept the reappearance of truth
would be to call being into question, to regard it as immersed in
destiny. It is just this peremptory refusal that renders vain the
interrogation on justice, since one can speak of justice only in
doubt, in the distance between entity and being.
In Girard' s case, freedom-posited
in terms of understanding the true and the good (as Camus understands it)-has no reason to exist: freedom is the other side of grace. Man, therefore,
does not have to interpret the true, since truth is, regardless of its
presentation. This perspective arrives at a paradox: an individual's action is justified and he is free of responsibility since his
action conforms to a previous and unchangeable design. This can
be seen in the pages of Dostoevskidu double a l'unite, at the point
where Girard comments on the legend of the Grand Inquisitor. 13
The Inquisitor does not want Christ to reappear, and thus wants
man to persist in the truth, in a completed history free of revelations. If man is not turned away from the presence and from
grace, the Inquisitor, inasmuch as he is the guarantee of and witness to the coming of the truth, will find himself faced with the
event he tried to cancel: the return of truth. Girard realizes that
the death of God might correspond not to his disappearance but
to his appearance, or better, to his reappearance; he considers this
possibility, but immediately consigns it once again to the silence
of certainty. In fact, Girard traces for the Inquisitor the typical
course of whoever harbors doubts about the divinity: the descent
into hell, the fall into the underground, a place of no doubts, but
of certainties:
If the world flees Christ instead of following him, He will make
this flight serve his plan of redemption. He will do in division and
contradiction what he wanted to do in union and in joy. In seeking
to become divine without Christ, man puts himself on the cross. It
is the freedom of Christ, deflected but alive, that generates the
underground. 14

As can be seen, negation is the confirmation of the presence in its
immutability.
If we consider what Girard says about the triangular structure of desire, we see that the central moment is the acknowledgment of desire as the expression of nothingness.
All this
generates idolatry to the extent that it requires the overcoming of
this state, that is, reconciliation.
We have here an absolutely
dialectical articulation, marked by the resolution of conflict
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according to a procedure regulated by negativity. In fact it is
death that harmonizes, that puts an end to tensions; it is in death
that Girard finds the presence of grace. We can discover what we
have been talk ing about in the explicit of Mensonge romantique et
desir romanesque, a comment on the verses of the Gospel of John
used by Dostoevski as the epigraph to The Brothers Karamazov:
"Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the
ground and die , it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth
much fruit." We believe that the pages in which Girard comments
on these words are the core of his thought, where we see the primacy of unity, of being, quite far from oblivion. This vision
springs from an analysis of the world of novels, a reflection that
embraces authors like Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Dostoevski,
Proust. Girard finds in a certain type of novel what becomes a
sort of universal, whose value transcends the present and
acquires unlimited significance.
To verify what we have said, let us dwell on the opening of
"Pour un nouv eau proces de L'Etranger."
Girard does not bother to prepare himself for Camus's text.
He does not accept, as Gadamer would say,15 the demands of tradition as the origin of dialogue, but unhesitatingly sets the limits
within which the text must move. What are these limits? The
first and most apparent consists of making the character of
Mersault express the emotions that rouse all men : "love, hate,
ambition, greed , jealousy." 16 When he identifies Mersault with
emotion, Girard takes the first and definitive step toward setting
him up within his model of the modern novel. Indeed, when
Mersault expresses a desire (which for Girard corresponds to
Camus's desire for success), The Stranger is inscribed in the
schema of triangular desire and the absurd becomes the opposite
of grace . As Girard says:
The character of Mersault frames the nihilistic individualism
exposed in The Myth of Sisyphus which is generally designated by
the word "absurd." Mersault is possessed by the absurd like some
people, in another spiritual context, are possessed by grace. 17

If it is kept in mind that we are at the incipit of the essay dedicated to The Stranger,it is easily seen that Girard's intentions are
not to understand the text. Indeed he commits an act of misunderstanding, whose object is not so much The Stranger but rather
The Myth of Sisyphus. What does Girard do? He merely places the
absurd and mercy in a reflective relationship, or rather he estab-
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lishes a connection between openness and divinity: in other
words, he is true to the idea that the present is, that the truth is
expressed in it. The fusion of horizons as the initial moment of
understanding is lost, thus confirming the Derridian thesis discussed above, according to which this phenomenon, interpretation as the suspension of tradition, is typical of psychoanalytical
interpretation. 18 In "Pour un nouveau proces de L'Etranger,"
Girard merely demystifies the underground plan of Camus's discourse on the absurd, and at the same time reinforces his own
bias, in the sense that he confirms his own convictions, his own
discourse.
3. ETHICS OF ACTION

If one looks closely, Girard' s horizon is structured, as
Pareyson maintains when he defines ideological discourse, on a
finite temporality, not subject to diastasis: the two polarities fixed
by Girard (God-metaphysical desire) derive from the same thing,
so there is no dialectical dynamic that culminates in synthesis.
There is no movement, since one begins with being only to stay
with being. It is not by chance that Girard self-confidently applies
his method to an author like Dostoevski and to an author like
Camus; indeed, this perfectly demonstrates that his bias tends
toward atemporality. Paradoxically, by following Girard's pseudo-articulation, one can grasp what Heidegger maintains in his
"Letter on 'Humanism.'" Responding to Jean Beaufret's question,
"How can sense be restored to the word 'humanism'?,"
Heidegger notes that in Western thought, man values being
regardless of its truth. 19 Metaphysics, Heidegger believes, continues to maintain its dominion even when, as in Sartre's case, one
claims the precedence of existence over essence 20 : all this leads
one to not consider the essence of existence, to not see that man
ex-ists, that he is near to existence. 21
Now what Girard does not consider is precisely existence as
man's taking part in the destiny of being (oblivion). This, in our
opinion, is Girard' s position when he speaks of the absurd and of
revolt, that is, when he interprets Camus's text.
The openness of the present, its non-occurrence, is irreconcilable with the radicalization of his preconception, a radicalization
that imposes reflection on essence and existence beginning with
his non-consideration of the oblivion of being. True to the metaphysical tradition, therefore, Girard ignores the possibility that
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the absurd is existence and, without a shadow of doubt, fixes the
presence of truth in human action, assimilating Camus's thought
to Sartre's existentialism. It is understandable that Girard effects
this translation of Camus's thought, inasmuch as he persists in it.
Identifying the absurd with metaphysical desire, he feels the need
to defend history or, better, his idea of history, to which he ideologically attributes the value of truth. From this it results that the
position of Camus, for whom history is expression and revelation,
must necessarily be rethought, that is, reduced to expression, to a
present that cannot be altered by appearances. In realizing all
this, Girard makes Sartre's considerations in "Reponse a Albert
Camus" his own. With the goal of defending the primacy of existence, which absorbs essence within itself, Sartre accuses Camus
of rejecting history in the name of transcendence, 22 that is, of separation. In the Sartre-Camus controversy, the latter, who initiated
the differend with the well-known "Lettre au directeur des Temps
Modernes," upholds an absolutely specular idea: Sartre's position,
centered on the priority of existence, celebrates action, and therefore the present as the end of history. Camus thus accuses Sartre
of making action the foundation of history, transforming history
into ideology, with the result that he forgets that truth is a quest. 23
Girard, therefore, interprets the absurd on the basis of a
strange and profitable mixture between the positions of Sartre
and Camus. He accepts Sartre's idea that Camus is opposed to
history, sending it off to a preconceived and useful wait. Nothing
keeps Girard from subscribing to this idea . Nonetheless, after
having taken Sartre's side he puts himself in a position that clearly reveals his bias and interest: he contemplates the absurd as
metaphysical desire, as aspiration to centrality, and thus points
out the correspondence Heidegger observed between the metaphysical tradition and Sartrian humanism. Put another way, he
who questions himself about being finds himself in the same position as he who denies it in the name of existence. This is not surprising since, as Heidegger teaches, it is impossible to get away
from metaphysics, although it should be noted here that, in seeing
grace in the absurd, Girard assimilates Camus's position to
Sartre's and thus does not take account of their difference.
Indeed, Girard does not really understand this correspondence,
but advances it because of the transhistorical character of his
model of reading. There is nothing surprising in the way Girard
interprets The Stranger:it is natural that he interprets it in his own
way. Obviously this penchant means that the interpretation loses
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its revelatory character, that is, its dimension of listening to being
in the language.
I believe Girard was unconcerned about this when he placed
himself before Camus's text; after all, he proceeds from a truth
without blemish, from being without destiny. Nonetheless, it is
opportune to assess the consequences of this interpretive model
from an ethical point of view, since Girard bases his own discourse on and in morality. In Mensonge romantique et desire
romanesque,Girard reveals the origins of metaphysical desire and
the underground world, whose logic constitutes the rejection of
ethics, the refusal to stand face-to-face with the other. In fact the
overcoming of this state is found in the reconciliation achieved in
God. It is in the rediscovery of centrality, therefore, that otherness
is acknowledged. In this regard Girard asserts, "A victory over
self-love permits us to descend deeply into the ego and with the
same movement gives us the recognition of the Other." 24 This
idea of ethics also guides Girard' s thinking in Dostoevskidu double
a l'unite; indeed, in this text it is even more clear, since Girard
speaks of Dostoevski's sinking into the underground and his consequent rediscovery of the light, of grace. 25 There are no doubts,
therefore, that Girard considers a certain type of novel as the
place where the thought of an epoch is made manifest, a type
marked by the crisis of values, by the loss of moral motivations,
and by the need to rediscover them. The same coordinates
emerge in "Pour un nouveau proces de L'Etranger," in which he
seeks to inscribe Camus's thought in the dynamic described
above-in the negation-affirmation of God-thereby
eliminating
the possibility that the absurd can be an interrogation on being,
can be distance.
At this point, however, there is an event that cannot be
ignored. When Mersault becomes "the man of Dostoevski's
underground," 26 we not only have a confirmation of the value of
Girard's thought, but something else happens that is ethically
important. Girard declares that access to justice and morality
through a non-dialectical process is impossible.
In fact, the
absurd is nothing but man's taking responsibility after the presence-absence of God. Camus is explicit about this in L'homme
revolte, where he notes that revolt (the absurd) has not found an
application in history except in terms of deviation: revolt is
inevitably linked to the State-that is, it is transformed into revolution, into centrality, and thus fails in responsibility. According
to Camus the absurd, as separation from and depresentation of
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the present, demands that the subject can no longer take refuge in
God, that man cannot be invested and helped by his presence.
The openness of being defines responsibility, since it keeps the
subject from proceeding intentionally, that is, from acting in the
name of God according to a design legitimated even in injustice.
Yet Girard seems to deny there is responsibility in separation, in
the oblivion of being, in a subject as I-for-other, to use Levinas's
expression.
This position seems to contradict the foundation of ethics. In
short, there is a paradox, for in the name of the other Girard erases otherness; in the name of a thought protected from the timelessness of ideology, he brings everything back to sameness. Even
more peculiarly, the supposed dialectical movement is not really
such: he establishes an interpretive model and applies it inexorably to different texts, which he never listens to but simply
translates and reduces. The tension that marks dialectical thought
is missing, since Girard does not limit himself to establishing his
own position, but also defines the antithetical position and, of
course, their unification. That Girard radicalizes history as present and event can be seen in his defense of the quotidian. He
seeks to defend public opinion and, more precisely, its values,
from the doubts of a moral nature raised by Camus. According to
Girard, Camus claims the arbitrariness of values, therefore value
as desire for power; nonetheless, his discourse is unable to escape
this logic and he seeks to disguise it with the problem of justice.27
Continuing on this path, Girard runs up against the question of
"authentic existence," and of course he can only reject the hypothesis that the quotidian is the occurrence of the possibility of
impossibility and its re-presentation. 28 Finiteness cannot, therefore, call into discussion the advent of the present, whose temporal narrowness is led toward the timelessness of being, in the
sense that the present partakes of the infinity of negation. All this
develops in Girard' s discourse under the guise of a defense of
current values and the preconceptions of his public.
On the basis of what we have said, Girard's reading of The
Stranger constitutes a sort of celebration of bias, with the result
that tradition is received in terms of interruption. The fusion of
horizons occurs, then, as a radicalization and ahistoricity of the
present, which, as truth, rejects dialogue with tradition. This
seems to support the idea of discontinuity in hermeneutical practice, a possibility which, as has been noted, Girard did not contemplate: in fact, the foundation of the present is in a being that
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is, with the result that bias is truth. In this way an ethics of action
is affirmed in which the other, paradoxically, is not acknowledged
in history or daily life, but in synthesis-that
is, outside history.
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